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Abstract
This paper reviews the existing literature on the impact of migrants
networks on the patterns of international migration. It covers the theo-
retical channels at stake in the global eﬀect of the networks. It identiﬁes
the key issues, namely the impact on size, selection and concentration of
the migration ﬂows. The paper also reviews the empirical hurdles that
the researchers face in assessing the importance of networks. The key
issues concern the choice of micro vs a macro approach, the deﬁnition of
a network, the access to suitable data and the adoption of econometric
methods accounting for the main features of those data. Finally, the pa-
per reports a set of estimation outcomes reﬂecting the main ﬁndings of
the macro approach.
11 Introduction
This paper investigates how existing diasporas or networks (i.e. stock of im-
migrants of own national background already resident in a given destination)
impact the number, skill composition and geographical concentration of new
migrants. The role of the diaspora on migration ﬂows is well known and undis-
puted. The contribution of this paper is both methodological and empirical.
Using global aggregate data, we show that diasporas not only inﬂuence the fu-
ture ﬂows but also their other characteristics, such as composition and concen-
tration. We present various econometric and data challenges that are relevant
in this literature, discuss how we try to resolve them and show how diﬀerent
empirical methods inﬂuence the results. In order to guide our thinking on the
diaspora eﬀects, we construct a uniﬁed yet simple theoretical framework based
on various bilateral factors that inﬂuence migration costs. Among the main
determinants of migration costs are distance, linguistic overlap, political bonds
such as colonial links.
We argue that diaspora externalities inﬂuence migration patterns (ﬂow size,
skill composition and concentration) through their eﬀect on bilateral migra-
tion costs. These diaspora externalities operate through two main channels.
First, diasporas reduce assimilation and information costs for newcomers. They
help them with jobs, housing, education and various cultural adjustment issues.
Second, diasporas attract new migrants through family reunion programs and
other venues that lower legal migration barriers. Assessing the combined ef-
fect of these two channels is key to understand the dynamics of the size and
composition of migration ﬂows.
Until recently, the analysis of diaspora externalities has been conducted at
the micro level (see Boyd, 1989, Massey, 1993, Munshi, 2003, McKenzie and
Rapoport, 2010). Individual or household level micro data have multiple ad-
vantages such as detailed information on demographic, human capital, social and
economic parameters. However a major drawback of those micro approaches is
that they can only focus on a limited number of migration corridors at time
(e.g. the Mexican-US corridor) and can hardly be generalized to other country
pairs. An exception is provided by Beine et al (2010) who use bilateral macro-
data on migration ﬂows and stocks. They took advantage of a recent data set
on international migration by educational attainment to investigate the role
of diaspora size on the educational structure of migration from 195 countries
to the 30 OECD countries. Their paper shows that networks are by far the
most important determinant of migration ﬂows, explaining 71 percent of the
observed variability of the size of migration ﬂows, and 47% of the variability of
the selection ratio in 2000.
In this paper, we extend the study of Beine et al. by looking at the diaspora
eﬀect on the geographical concentration or dispersion of new migrants, and
by comparing results obtained with diﬀerent estimation techniques. Indeed, a
macro analysis of diaspora externalities raises multiple econometric problems.
The main issues are the large number of empty corridors (due to truncation rules
or true ’zeroes’), and the diﬃculty to identify causation (unobserved variables
2are likely to aﬀect the existing stock of migrants and the ﬂows of newcomers).
Several econometric techniques are available to address these issues; one of our
goals is to evaluate the quantitative robustness of diaspora externalities to the
choice of a particular method.
The remainder of this paper is organized as following. Section 2 depicts
theory and key issues. Section 3 reviews the main empirical hurdles researchers
face when studying the impact of diasporas. Section 4 discusses econometric
issues while Section 5 presents some estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theory and key issues
We ﬁrst consider a simpliﬁed version of the model use din Beine et. al. (2010)
to describe how existing diasporas impact the size, skill composition, and geo-
graphic concentration of migration ﬂows. An individual endowed with h units
of human capital earns a wage wih in country i = 1,...,I, where wi is the skill
price in that country. The skill price is linked to labor productivity and the
level of development of the country. This structure accommodates the assump-
tions that the main variation in wages within a country is due to diﬀerences
in human capital levels (h) among workers whereas the main source variation
across countries is due to the skill prices (wi). The utility of a type-h individual
working in his birth country (denoted o) is given by
uoo(h) = woh + Ao + εo
where Ao is a variable capturing non-wage characteristics and amenities (such
as climate) of the home country.
The utility obtained when the same person migrates to a destination country
d is given by
uod(h) = wdh + Ad − Cod(h) + εd
where Cod(h) denotes moving and assimilation costs that are borne by the mi-
grant. Those costs depend on factors such as physical distance, destination
and origin countries’ social, cultural and linguistic characteristics. Assimilation
costs are generally assumed to be decreasing with human capital (∂Cod/∂h < 0)
since high-skilled migrants tend to have more adaptive and transferrable linguis-
tic, technical and cultural skills. A second set of costs involve policy induced
costs faced by the migrant to overcome legal hurdles created by the destina-
tion country d. These would include migration related fees, legal barriers to
citizenship and other civil rights, which we refer to as visa costs with slight
abuse of terminology. Again, it is generally the case that these visa costs are
lower for high-skilled migrants, especially in the presence of selective migration
programs that speciﬁcally target highly educated workers and give them special
preferences and priorities.
Let No denote the size of the native population that is within migration age
in country o. When the random term εi follows an iid extreme-value distribution
3(see McFadden, 1974), the probability that a type-h individual born in country
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= (wd − wo)h + (Ad − Ao) − Cod(h) (1)
This model with a single skill dimension h is rich enough to depict some key
patterns of international migration. Among these, the most important are the
following:
• The size of bilateral migration ﬂows Nod increases with the wage diﬀeren-
tial (wd −wo), diﬀerences in country ﬁxed eﬀects or amenities (Ad −Ao),
and decreases with the level of overall migration costs (Cod).
• Migration rates are lower for low-skilled workers than for the high-skilled
since the latter beneﬁt more from wage diﬀerentials and have lower mi-
gration costs (positive selection).
• The proportion of high-skilled migrants is larger in countries with higher
skill prices (positive sorting).
The key insight from the model is that it helps us to understand how existing
diasporas aﬀect the magnitude and structure of migration ﬂows. In what follows,
we denote the size of the diaspora from country o in country d by Mod. We show
how diaspora externalities can be introduced into the equation (1) and how they
can be empirically estimated using bilateral data on migration stocks and ﬂows.
2.1 Impact on size
As mentioned above, existing social networks or diasporas reduce migration
costs through two main channels. First, they lower information, assimilation
and adaptation costs. For example, members of a diaspora can help new mi-
grants ﬁnd jobs, adjust to diﬀerent social norms and navigate linguistic barriers.
Second, family members who have migrated earlier and obtained certain legal
rights in the destination country can lower the visa costs. This channel mainly
operates by allowing migrants to beneﬁt from family reuniﬁcation programs for
their legal entry into the destination country. For these reasons, the diaspora
size are included in the determinants of migration costs and Cod becomes a
function of Mod with ∂Cod/∂Mod < 0.
The size-externality of diasporas can be tested by regressing skill-speciﬁc
bilateral ﬂows, Nod(h), on the stock of existing migrants at the beginning of the
period, Mod. Assuming a logarithmic functional form for the diaspora eﬀect,
equation (1) can now be rewritten as
ln[Nod(h)] = αh
o + αh
d + βh ln[Mod] + δhDod + ηh
od (2)
4where αh
o ≡ ln[Noo(h)] − w0h − A0 captures origin-country ﬁxed eﬀects and
αh
d ≡ wdh+Ad denotes destination country ﬁxed eﬀects. Dod is a vector of other
observable bilateral variables aﬀecting migration decisions (such as distance,
linguistic overlap, and historical/political connections) and ηh
od is the error term.
A positive value for βh is expected if existing networks reduce migration costs
and, thus, increase migration ﬂows.
2.2 Impact on skill selection
If the eﬀect of existing networks varies by skill group, then diaspora size will
also inﬂuence selection eﬀects in terms of human capital levels. Indeed, as as-
similation and information costs are sources of positive selection (because they
decrease with human capital), any factor that lowers migration costs will favor
low-skilled migrants. Second, when the diaspora size is bigger, the probability
that a migrant relies on an economic migration program declines and the prob-
ability she/he will beneﬁt from family reunion programs increases. In short, the
advantages of being skilled are likely to be less important when a destination
country already hosts a large diaspora from a given origin country. As a re-
sult, ceteris paribus, countries with larger diasporas will tend to attract a larger
proportion of less skilled migrants.
Eﬀect of diasporas on educational/skill composition of migrant ﬂows can be
indirectly evaluated by diﬀerentiating the βh obtained from the skill-speciﬁc
regressions in (2). A more direct way to capture this externality is to regress
the log-ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled migrants on the overall diaspora size.
Denoting by h and h the human capital levels of high-skilled and low-skilled indi-





By subtracting equation (1) for low skill levels from the parallel equation for
high skill levels, we obtain
ln[Sod] = αo + αd + β ln[Mod] + δDod + ηod (3)




− w0(h − h) is a origin-country ﬁxed eﬀect,
αd ≡ wd(h − h) is a destination country ﬁxed eﬀect, and ηod is the error term.
We should note that these ﬁxed eﬀect parameters and error terms are not the
same as the ones in (2); we are just using parallel notation A negative value for
β is expected if existing networks reduce positive selection and larger diasporas
lead to larger proportion of low skilled migrants.
2.3 Impact on relative concentration
The next question is about the impact of diasporas on the relative concentration
of migration ﬂows across education levels. Unskilled migrants from a given
country will be more concentrated (relative to skilled migrants) if they go to
fewer number of countries in larger numbers. The impact of diasporas on the
concentration levels should be in line with the eﬀect in terms of selection. In
particular, if diasporas tends to reinforce a negative selection process, it should
5increase the concentration of low-skilled migrants compared to the concentration
of high-skilled migrants.
















A nice property of this bilateral measure is that its sum across destination
countries boils down to the diﬀerence between Herﬁndhal indices for high-skilled
and low-skilled migrants. The equation to be estimated for relative concentra-
tion can be written as the following:
RCod = αo + αd + β ln[Mod] + δDod + ηod (5)
Similar to previous two equations, we have αo and αd as the origin and destina-
tion ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively, Dod is a vector of explanatory bilateral variables
and ηod is the error term. A negative value for β is expected if existing networks
increase the concentration of low-skilled migrants across destinations compared
to the concentration of the high-skilled migrants.
3 Key empirical issues
Our main empirical goal is to quantify the diaspora eﬀects on the size, skill com-
position and concentration of migration ﬂows as well as evaluate the robustness
of the elasticity based on econometric techniques used. We use the Docquier,
Lowell and Marfouk (2009, referred to as DLM from now on) database. Based
on census and register information on the size and structure of immigration in
all OECD countries, DLM database provides the stock of migrants from any
given country to any one of the 30 OECD countries by education level for 1990
and 2000. The dataset covers only the adult population aged 25 and over, and
migration is deﬁned on the basis of the country of birth rather than citizenship1.
We should note that the DLM database does not fully capture undocumented
migration for which systematic statistics by education level and country of ori-
gin are not available in most destination countries. US census is believed to
count most undocumented migrants, however this is not the case in many other
OECD countries. By disregarding undocumented migrants (which are dispropor-
tionately unskilled), the database probably underestimates bilateral migration
stocks/ﬂows and overestimates the average level of education of the immigrant
populations in many destination OECD countries.
1Even though this is the standard deﬁnition of a migrant, especially in the economics liter-
ature, the dataset does not include second generation children who are born in the destination
country even though they might constitute an important part of a diaspora in the sociological
sense. This is simply due to absence of comprehensive administrative data in tracking of
the migrants’ children. However, we expect diaspora sizes inclusive and exclusive of second
generation to be highly correlated.
6The main strength of the DLM database is that it distinguishes between
three levels of education for migrants. High-skilled migrants are those with post-
secondary/tertiary education. Medium-skilled migrants are those with upper-
secondary education completed. Low-skilled migrants are those with less than
upper-secondary education, including those with lower-secondary and primary
education or those who did not go to school. The main characteristics of the
diaspora that we consider in this paper are the following:
• The bilateral migration ﬂow for each skill group from origin country o to
destination OECD country d is proxied by the change between 1990 and
2000 in the stock of migrants from o to d.
• The bilateral indicator of positive selection is proxied by the log-ratio of
the number of high-skilled to low-skilled new migrants from o to d (we
disregard medium-skilled migrants for this speciﬁcation with no impact
on the results)
• The bilateral indicator of relative concentration is the ’high-skill minus
low-skill’ diﬀerence in the squared proportions of migrants from a given
origin country o to the 30 possible destinations, following equation (4).
• The size of the existing diaspora is measured as the immigrant population
born in country o and living in the OECD country d ( = o) in 1990.
3.1 Individual vs aggregate data
The use of aggregate macro data has many advantages but also introduces
certain complications. In this section, we discuss the pros and cons of using
this dataset, and the main econometric issues triggered by our approach. An
important distinction in the empirical analysis of migration data concerns the
use of a individual (micro) data as opposed to aggregate (macro) one. Micro
data are collected at the household and/or individual level to study the impact
of networks on the propensity to migrate and the educational composition of
the migrants (Massey, 1986; Munshi, 2003, McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010).
These datasets include diﬀerent measures of individual economic, demographic
and social characteristics, such as age, income, occupation and education. This
contrasts with more approaches the employ aggregate international migration
data. Both approaches have their advantages and drawbacks and should be seen
as complementary strategies to address the key issues at stake here.
By focusing on individuals or households, micro data directly accounts for
the role of individual characteristics of the migrants. For example, McKenzie
and Rapoport (2010) conﬁrm that the networks are more important for unedu-
cated migrants than for educated ones in the case of Mexican migration to the
United States. Another appealing feature of the micro datasets is that they can
distinguish between diﬀerent types of networks such as networks deﬁned at the
community (city or region) level or at the household (family) level. If such data
were available, then we can identify what kind of assistance (such as ﬁnancial
7support or cultural assimilation) is provided by diﬀerent network along the lines
suggested by Massey (1986).
A ﬁnal appealing feature is the possibility of ﬁnding suitable instruments
for the network at destination. Since both the current migration ﬂows and
diasporas (i.e. past migration ﬂows) are inﬂuenced by same factors, endogeneity
and other statistical problems (see section on the reﬂection problem) arise in
the estimation. Appropriate instruments should be strong predictors of the
network but be uncorrelated with the size of the ﬂows or their composition (i.e.
the dependent variables). Munshi (2003) provides a good example for networks
deﬁned at the community level, again for the Mexico-US corridor. Rainfall in
origin communities in Mexico are supposed to predict the rate of emigration of
those migrants but are uncorrelated with labor market outcomes at destination
(in the US) that are potentially aﬀected by Mexican networks already present.
A major drawback of micro datasets is that they can consider only a limited
number of corridors at a time. That is why a large number of the studies focus
on the Mexican-US migration patterns since that is where the best datasets
exist. Most other prominent corridors lack such detailed and high-quality data.
Furthermore, destination selection eﬀects are quite limited since the US is the
destination for more than 99% of the Mexican migrants. This is unfortunately
not the case for a majority of origin countries which send their migrants to a
diversiﬁed set of destination countries. Even in origin countries where migrants
have a limited number of choices, the patterns are likely to vary across desti-
nation countries. A good example is provided by Cape Verde, which sends a
majority of its unskilled migrants to Portugal while sending the most skilled
migrants to the US.
Pooling a large set of origin and destination countries in a macro dataset
makes it possible to statistically assess the determinants of the various patterns
in international migration which might not be easily captured in an analysis of
a single corridor. Furthermore, a large number of cells in a migration matrix
are ﬁlled with zeros (see the section below for a more detailed discussion of this
critical issue.) The informational content of the empty cells (such as for the cor-
ridor between Cape Verde and Turkey) of migration ﬂows or diasporas between
country pairs is valuable. The presence of zeros reﬂects that the net gains of
migration in those corridors are too low for potential migrants and/or . certain
factors lead to high levels of migration costs. In other terms, while it creates
additional statistical complications that need to be addressed, the inclusion of
zero values in macro datasets tends to highlight and identify selection biases.
3.2 The widespread presence of zero observations
The Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (DLM, 2009) dataset includes almost all
origin countries in the world and 30 destination OECD countries. Many statis-
tical properties of the migration ﬂows and stocks can be easily constructed using
DLM. The distribution of the migration ﬂows turns out to be unimodal, highly
left skewed with a large amount of zero values for both the (net) migration ﬂows
between 1990 and 2000 and the stocks in 1990 and 2000. For example, for the
8ﬂows, DLM includes 34% of pairs of countries with zero values.
What do these large numbers of zero values truly reﬂect? For a group of
country pairs, the zero values might be the result of a statistical truncation pro-
cess. For instance, for reasons of statistical conﬁdentiality, national statistical
agencies might prefer not to report some low number of migrants of country o
in country d. This is reported to be the case for provincial data of international
migrants in Canada (see Wagner et al., 2003). Under 5 recorded migrants, the
statistical oﬃces are expected to report a zero to preserve the anonymity of
the migrants. Similarly, due to imperfect sampling, many smaller and positive
migrant stock and ﬂows might not be fully captured in censuses or labor force
surveys. Also, it is possible that a number diplomats are not counted in the
oﬃcial stock of migrants following international conventions.
In majority of the cases, a large number of zero values in the migration
datasets reﬂect true zeroes. Like in international trade, many bilateral migration
corridors are not ’proﬁtable’ so that there are simply no migrants to observe
and record. Ignoring such zero values would be highly detrimental to assess
the relevance of the determinants of international migration patterns. Zero
values imply that the costs of migration is too high for any potential migrant
to move from country o to country d. Among those factors, The absence of a
network at destination might be a leading factor that deters potential migrants
from choosing that particular destination.2 Therefore, it is important in the
empirical investigation of the network eﬀect to employ methods that properly
account for those zero migration ﬂows. For example, for the size estimation,
possible methods include Poisson regressions, 2-step Heckman approach and
Tobit. For the selection and relative concentration, however, Tobit and Poisson
regression methods are not possible.
3.3 Stocks vs Flows
A critical choice in the investigations of the network/diaspora eﬀect is the ap-
propriate dependent variables. For instance, in their investigation of the deter-
minants of international migration and in particular, the role of the bilateral
wage diﬀerential, Grogger and Hanson (2010) use stock data (observed in 2000)
which allows to focus on the long run eﬀects. Not surprisingly, variables such as
colonial links turn out to be strong predictors of stocks in the long run. Colo-
nial links exert two separate eﬀects. First, they allow people to move during
colonial times and shortly after independence through special legal rights and
arrangements. Part of those migrants are still included in the contemporaneous
stock, depending on when the independence was acquired and how long the legal
links were sustained. A second more indirect eﬀect is that colonial links cre-
ate a dependence path for future migrants through the assimilation and family
reuniﬁcation eﬀects. The relationship between migration ﬂows over a speciﬁc
period and the size of the stocks at the starting point of that period allows to
2Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006 show that ignoring the zero trade country pairs lead to
overestimation of other bilateral factors such as distance.
9capture the (short or medium-run) network eﬀects. Interestingly, when colonial
links are included in such a stock-ﬂow model, they turn out to be insigniﬁcant
since their eﬀect is absorbed by the existing network. From an economic point
of view, the implications of those results is that recent migrants tend to come
because they can rely on a network at destination, not because of past colonial
links that oﬀer current advantages.
The measurement of migration ﬂows in destination countries is also a tricky
issue. In most countries, we can rely on census data to provide the stock of
migrants in a given year. For most national census rounds, a ten-year frequency
is the rule. Therefore, the only way to measure migration ﬂows over a ten-year
period is to take the diﬀerence between stocks in two successive census rounds.
This in turn raises several additional complications. First, the net migration
ﬂows are aﬀected by the mortality rate of migrants present in the initial census.
Second, there can be signiﬁcant return migration which varies across origin and
destination countries. For instance, using US data, Rosenzweig (2008) shows
that the level of skill premia in the origin country is an important factor for the
return migration rate of skilled migrants and students. Third issue arises due to
regularization (legalization) programs implemented for undocumented migrants
who are not recorded in many censuses (such as in most European countries). If
regularization programs are implemented between the two censuses, the stocks
of migrants in the second census and hence the size of the migration ﬂows will
increase in the data without actual movement of people. Another theoretical
argument developed by Br¨ ucker (2006) suggests that using net migration ﬂows
instead of stocks might be misleading in the case of heterogeneous agents. This
is especially important when it comes to estimating the impact of wage dif-
ferentials on migration. In models like ours, we do not explicitly include the
wage diﬀerentials for several reasons. One reason is the absence of reliable wage
indices by skill level in most origin countries. A second reason is that wages
are captured by country ﬁxed eﬀects in most of our estimations. To sum up,
there are obviously negative and positive biases in measuring migrations ﬂows
through the changes in migrant stocks from census data. Whether this tends to
underestimate or overestimate the true values is obviously diﬃcult to know in
advance.
3.4 Deﬁning a network
The investigation of the network eﬀect relies on a speciﬁc deﬁnition of diaspora
which is the stock of nationals from country o living in destination d at a given
time. This is a natural deﬁnition of the people who are supposed to provide as-
sistance and help to the new arrivals. On the one hand, restricting the diaspora
to people with the same nationality might be restrictive. Ethnic networks are
also known to be eﬃcient and do not necessarily correspond to national borders.
Migrants speaking the same language can be also very useful for the assimila-
tion of new migrants. On the other hand, deﬁning the network at the national
level might overestimate the number of people able to provide help. Obviously,
people located in large countries such as the US can provide assistance mainly
10to a restricted number of new migrants within certain geographic proximity.
This is especially true if concentration of migrants in the destination country is
not very high.
3.5 The reﬂection problem
As explained by Manski (1993), one issue in identifying and estimating endo-
geneous social eﬀects like the network eﬀect is the presence of unobservable
correlated eﬀects. In our framework, it could be the case that unobservable
bilateral components will aﬀect the size of the diaspora Mij and the dependent
variables. For instance, unobserved cultural proximity between country i and
country j might aﬀect simultaneously the stock of migrants, the current ﬂows
of new migrants and their selection. The cross-sectional nature of the data pre-
vents us to estimate directly those unobservable components. Therefore, those
eﬀects will be included in the error term, which in turn leads to some kind of
omitted variable bias and to some correlation between Mij and the error term.
4 Econometric Methods
There are several alternative methods that can be used to estimate the impact
of diasporas on migration ﬂows, on their skill composition and on their relative
concentration by education. A simple and easy way of estimation the models is
OLS, but, high occurrence of zero observations is likely to lead to inconsistent
estimates. The use of a log speciﬁcation drops the zero observations from the
sample which is likely to result in biased estimates of the impact of diasporas
and other variables on the migration ﬂows and their selection. For instance,
it might be the case that there are no migrants from country i to country j
because migration costs are too high. In turn, migration costs might be too
high because distance is too high and there is no diaspora. In this case, the
exclusion of those observations leads to underestimation of the impact of the
variables aﬀecting the migration costs such as distance, colonial links, linguistic
similarities or diasporas.
One option is to use Heckman 2-step estimation methods to minimize the
bias due to selection issues. In general, for all the features that we analyze
(migration ﬂows, skill ratios and relative concentration), the ﬁrst step involves
the estimation of a selection equation - the probability for a given country pair
to have a positive migration ﬂow3. The usual procedure implies the use of an
instrument in the probit equation, i.e. a bilateral variable that inﬂuences the
probability of observing a diaspora between the two countries but does not in-
ﬂuence the size of this diaspora. It is obviously extremely diﬃcult to ﬁnd an
3To be more precise, for the analysis of migration stock, the probability that a given
observation will be included in the regression is directly related to the probability of observing
a diaspora (either regardless of the skill level, either for a particular skill level) for this country
pair. For the migration ﬂows, the probability is exactly the same since we have no case of
zero migration ﬂow with positive values of the stock in 1990 and 2000. For the analysis of
selection, the probability is related to the existence of a diaspora or at least a skilled diaspora.
11instrument that inﬂuences, in a sense, the arrival of the ﬁrst migrant (i.e. the
presence of a diaspora) but not the other migrants (i.e. the size of a diaspora).
One possible candidate is diplomatic representation of the destination country
in the origin country. Diplomatic representation might aﬀect the probability of
having at least one migrant by setting some kind of threshold on the visa costs
faced by the initial migrant. In the absence of any diplomatic representation
of country j in country i, the cost to get a visa can simply be too high so that
nobody would consider to migrate to country j. The role of diplomatic repre-
sentation in the migration process is to a certain extent analogous to the role
played by a common religion for trade relationships. As argued by Helpman et
al.(2007), a common religion (a proxy of costs of establishing business linkages)
aﬀects the extensive margin of trade (i.e. the probability of export) but not the
intensive margin (i.e. trade volumes). In regressions (2-3), the use of a two-step
Heckman approach yields intuitive results both for the ﬂow and for the selec-
tion equation. In particular, for the selection equation, we ﬁnd that diplomatic
representation of country j in county i tends to positively aﬀect the probability
of observing a diaspora of country i in country j. Furthermore, the mills ratio
turns out to be signiﬁcant in the ﬂow equation, suggesting that accounting for
a selection bias is important4.
An alternative is to use Poisson regression models that rely on pseudo max-
imum likelihood estimates, as advocated by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006)
who show that the use of log linearization for gravity models leads to incon-
sistent estimates of the coeﬃcients (such as the one relative to distance). One
main cause of this problem, as mentioned before, is the exclusion of zero ob-
servations for the dependent variable. A second reason is that the expected
value of the error will depend on the covariates of the model and hence will
lead to estimation biases of the coeﬃcient. The Poisson solution is nevertheless
unfeasible for the selection and the concentration analyses. For the selection,
the existence of zero values for Mi,j(h) leads to undeﬁned values for Sij, which
cannot be handled by the Poisson approach.
The above mentioned estimation methods do not address one solution pro-
posed by Munshi (2003) which is to estimate the eﬀects of Mij by IV. For that
purpose, one has to ﬁnd instruments of Mij, i.e. variables uncorrelated with
the ﬂows but that are good predictors of the stocks. Beine et al. (2010) use two
instruments. The ﬁrst is a dummy variable capturing whether the two countries
were subject to a temporary guest worker agreement in the 60’s and 70’s. One
can expect those guest worker agreements to exert a strong impact on the ini-
tial formation of a stock of migrants in the 60’s and the 70’s, hence inﬂuencing
the stock in 1990. In contrast, it is unclear why those initial agreements (that
4Since the observed level of diaspora in 1990 is used as a regressor, the use of diplomatic
representation leads to some colinearity problems in the selection equation. In order to miti-
gate the collinearity problems, it is possible to run Heckman two-step regressions without any
additional instrument. As stressed by Wooldridge (2002), the use of an additional instrument
in the probit equation is not strictly necessary. The drawback of not using an additional in-
strument is that the Mills ratio might become highly collinear with the explanatory variables
of the ﬂow equation, which in turn lowers the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients. This is not the
case for most of our regressions.
12are no longer valid) would inﬂuence the contemporaneous migration ﬂows be-
yond the impact exerted by the diaspora itself. For instance, it turns out that
guest worker agreements did not create any preferential treatment at the level
of country pairs in the migration policy. Therefore, it is expected that these
guest worker agreements are not themselves correlated with the bilateral unob-
servable components. Examples of such a process are illustrated for instance by
the impact of the post-war guest worker agreements between Belgium and Italy
or Spain.
The second instrument proposed by Beine et al. (2010) is a variable captur-
ing the unobserved diaspora in the 1960’s through a combination of variables
representing some push factor in country i , size in country i, openness and size
in country j and distance between i and j. We use four diﬀerent measures.
The basic measure is ln(popi ∗ immstj/distij)∗armedconflicti where popi is
the population size in the 60’s of country i, immstj is the immigrant stock of
country j in the 60’s, distij is the distance between i and j and armedconflicti
is a dummy variable capturing the occurrence of armed conﬂicts in country i
during the 60’s. To capture push-factors leading to emigration in the 1950s
and 1960s, we only consider conﬂicts observed between 1946 and 1960. We dis-
tinguish minor conﬂicts (number of battle-related deaths between 25 and 999)
denoted CONFL1 and wars (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year)
denoted CONFL2. The variables CONFL1 and CONFL2 sum up the number of
annual conﬂicts over the period 1946-1960. IV estimation methods are suited to
address the issues (size, selection and concentration) listed above. Nevertheless,
like OLS, they are subject to issues related to the selection bias. A combination
of Poisson regression models along with IV estimation is proposed by Tenreyro
(2009) within the GMM framework. This is relevant only for the size issues but
it is nevertheless beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Results
After listing all the potential problems with the data, estimation methods and
identiﬁcation issues, we ﬁnally turn to the estimation of the three main equations
listed above (2, 3 and 5) which correspond to analysis of the impact of diasporas
on the size, skill composition and concentration of migration ﬂows, respectively.
Table 1 reports the results for ﬁve diﬀerent estimation techniques for the
estimation of the impact of diaspora on migration ﬂows. The techniques used
are OLS (using lows as the dependent variable), Heckman two stage method with
and without an instrument for the selection, Maximum likelihood Poisson and
IV regression (on the ﬂows as well) using the two above mentioned instruments.
The results illustrate the strong robustness of the estimation of the key elasticity
parameter which ranges between 0.62 and 0.76. This means that a 1% increase
in the size of the migrant network present in the destination country in 1990
tends to increase the subsequent migrant ﬂow from a given origin country over
the next ten years by around 0.7%. This result is in line with some of the
previous results in the literature using the US data. For instance, focusing only
13on family reuniﬁcation programs, Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986, 1988) show that
the multiplier associated with sponsored migration is about 1.2. If this were
true for other countries, our results suggest that the multiplier associated with
the pure network eﬀect (assimilation eﬀect) should be around 1.5 for the US.
the coeﬃcients of the other explanatory variables are also worth noting. The
common language and (log) distance variables are signiﬁcant in all cases with
the expected sizes. A 1% increase in distance between a pair of countries reduces
migration ﬂows by around 0.3-0.5%. Similarly, if two countries share a common
language, they experience between 30-60% higher migration ﬂows. Unlike it is
the case with linguistic overlap and distance, the eﬀect of colonial links is not
robust to the estimation method used, as we had mentioned earlier. Once we
control for the diaspora size, the contemporaneous eﬀect on the ﬂow weakens
considerably.
Table 2 looks at the selection issue, using the log of the skill ratio (log of the
number of skilled migrants over unskilled migrants from o to d) as the dependent
variable. Four diﬀerent estimation results are reported. The ﬁrst one uses OLS
applied to the log of the ratio (observed in 2000). The second column reports
the same estimate but with Heckman two stage method (without instrument).
The third column does the same but on the change in the (log of) the skill ratio
between 2000 and 1990. Finally, the last column also looks at the variation
but using instrumental variable. The results shows that the networks exert
important eﬀect in terms of negative selection. In the ﬁrst two cases, we see
that diasporas signiﬁcantly reduce the overall skill level of migrant stocks. More
speciﬁcally, a 1% increase in the diaspora size reduces the skill ratio by around
0.2%. Linguistic overlap, distance and Schengen agreement, on the other hand,
increase the skill composition while colonial links has no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect. In the last two columns, the results show that the diaspora size also
negatively inﬂuences the change in the skill ratio. In other words, if there is
larger diaspora from country o in country d, the migrant ﬂows become more
unskilled more rapidly. The coeﬃcients of the other explanatory variables also
have the expected and signiﬁcant signs.
Table 3 investigates the same analysis but on the relative concentration be-
tween skilled and unskilled migrants as explained earlier. We use three diﬀerent
estimation methods. In the ﬁrst two (OLS, Heckman two stage method), the
dependent variable is the level of relative concentration of skilled migrants as
given in (5); the third estimation uses Heckman two stage method with the
change in the relative concentration measure as the dependent variable. The
results from the ﬁrst two columns show that a 1% increase in the diaspora size
tends to decreases the relative concentration of skilled migrants with respect to
the unskilled ones by around 0.5%. Furthermore, larger diaspora size also neg-
atively inﬂuences the change in the relative concentration of skilled migrants.
These results are in line with and conﬁrm the results above concerning the skill
selection of the migrants.
146 Conclusion
This paper reviews the existing literature on the impact of migrant networks
(diasporas) on the international migration patterns. In addition to size of the
migration ﬂows, we include the skill composition and concentration among these
patterns we analyze and show that diasporas strongly inﬂuence all three. We
ﬁrst present a simple theoretical model that identiﬁes the channels through
which diasporas would inﬂuence migration patterns. These channels mainly
operate through lowering of bilateral migration barriers via assimilation eﬀects
and family reuniﬁcation programs. It identiﬁes the key issues, namely the im-
pact on size, selection and concentration of the migration ﬂows. The paper also
reviews the data and econometric hurdles that the researchers face in assessing
the importance of networks. Among the key issues are the choice of individual
micro vs aggregate macro approach, the deﬁnition of a network, the access to
suitable data, and the adoption of econometric methods accounting for the main
features of those data, such as wide prevalence of zeros.
The main results are illustrated with estimation results obtained using the
Docquier-Lowell-Marfouk (DLM, 2009) data. Larger networks are shown to
exert strong positive inﬂuence on the size of the international ﬂows and lead to
lower skill composition for a given corridor. We also show that diasporas also
favour the concentration of the unskilled migrants with respect to the skilled
ones. Destination and origin country speciﬁc factors are captured via ﬁxed
eﬀects. All other bilateral variables, such as linguistic overlap, distance, colonial
linkages have the expected signs and economically signiﬁcant eﬀects.
Naturally, there are many questions remain unanswered. One venue to con-
sider is whether if these results hold for non-OECD destination countries and
south-south migration. They require higher quality data that covers larger num-
ber of destination countries outside the OECD. Another key issue is separating
the assimilation eﬀect of diasporas from the visa eﬀect which operates mainly
through the family reuniﬁcation programs. Such questions will require diﬀerent
types of dataset that combine aggregate data with household level data. In
closing, diasporas are among the key determinants of migration patterns and
we have only scratched the surface in identifying their eﬀects.
15Table 1. Determinants of migration ﬂows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Heck with Heck w/o Poisson IV
Lagged diasp 0.620 0.660 0.699 0.703 0.761
(34.35)*** (47.97)*** (43.91)*** (16.20)*** (10.92)***
Col links 0.331 0.219 0.127 -0.312 -0.051
(2.45)** (2.03)** (1.10) (1.65)* (0.26)
language 0.388 0.477 0.496 0.298 0.234
(5.20)*** (6.71)*** (6.48)*** (2.53)** (2.27)**
Log(dist) -0.408 -0.501 -0.448 -0.337 -0.259
(9.04)*** (12.04)** (10.69)*** (3.28)*** (2.84)***
Schengen 0.168 0.257 0.277 0.061 0.160
(1.19) (2.00) (2.02)** (0.23) (1.11)
Constant 3.750 2.785 2.365 3.461 2.365
(6.92)*** (4.82)*** (4.02)*** (3.06)*** (2.69)
Observations 3608 5610 5760 5374 3486
Mills ratio - 0.908 1.19 - -
(7.60)*** (9.35)*** - -
16Table 2. Impact of diaspora on selection ( level and change in log
high-skill/low-skill ratio)
Log-skill ratio Log-skill ratio ∆LSR ∆LSR
(OLS) (Heck) (Heck) (IV)
Lagged diasp -0.171 -0.194 -0.212 -0.215
(16.19)*** (20.62)*** (17.62)*** (2.95)***
Col links -0.042 -0.022 0.101 0.270
(0.62) (0.32) (1.67)* (1.77)*
language 0.466 0.460 0.176 0.235
(9.38)*** (9.37)*** (4.17)*** (3.19)***
Log(dist) 0.096 0.090 0.086 0.019
(3.35)*** (3.40)*** (3.78)*** (0.30)
Schengen 0.502 0.519 0.390 0.414
(5.65)*** (6.26)*** (5.48)*** (6.08)***
Constant -1.109 -0.734 -1.250 -0.481
(1.16) (1.32) (2.54)** (0.63)
Mills - (-0.380) (-0.10) -
- (6.86)*** (0.22) -
F-stat First stage - - - 30.07
Hansen J-test (p-value) - - - 0.747
Observations 3486 5760 5760 3486
Absolute values of robust t statistics in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Instrument sets for Mij in all columns include a dummy for bilateral
guest-worker agreements and a proxy for diaspora size in 1960. In column (1) ,
the proxy is computed as ln(popi ∗ immstj/distij) ∗ Conf1i.In column (2) ,
the proxy is computed as ln(popi ∗ immstj/distij) ∗ Conf2i;in column (3), the
proxy is computed as ln(popi ∗ immstj/distij) ∗ (conf1i + Conf2i).
17Table 3. Explaining relative concentration between high-skill and
low-skill and change in relative concentration
Rel conc Rel conc ∆RC
(OLS) (Heck) (Heck)
Lagged diasp -0.502 -0.514 -0.008
(5.87)*** (9.67)*** (16.05)***
Col. links -4.635 -4.619 -0.040
(4.68)*** (10.69)*** (9.93)***
Language 0.338 0.321 -0.004
(0.84) (1.09) (1.58)
Log(dist) 0.266 0.269 0.006
(1.24) (1.69)* (3.78)***
Schengen -0.193 -0.180 0.002
(0.50) (0.36) (0.49)




Observations 3920 5730 5730
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
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